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THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM AND THE 

DECISIONMAKING INDEPENDENCE OF 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: 

LESSONS FOR A PROPOSED 

FEDERAL PROGRAM 

MALCOLM C. RICH· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ten years ago administrative law judges were so well hidden 
from America's justice system that they were sometimes called "the 
hidden judiciary."1 Yet this administrative judiciary continues to 
playa major role in deciding not only decisions regarding individual 
financial well-being but policy decisions as well. There are more 
than 4,000 federal and state administrative law judges.2 
Administrative law judges serve numerous agencies at both the 
state and federal levels, resolving often complex disputes between 
agencies and the public in such diverse areas as commerce, commu­
nications, health and safety, social security and rates for gas, electric 
and telephone service. Although their decisions are "initial deci­
sions" subject to review, in practice most become the final agency 
opinion; what they decide thus affects the daily lives of virtually 
everyone. 
Historically, administrative adjudication has evolved from a 
time in which hearing examiners were used merely to improve effi­
ciency by gathering facts for use by agency officials.3 In the more 
• Director, Foundation for Educational Research, Inc., a nonprofit research center 
located in Chicago. J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1979. 
This article is based in part on a monograph by Mr. Rich and Wayne E. Brucar, The 
CenJrai Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: A Survey ofSeven Slates, © 1983, 
American Judicature Society. Published with permission of the American Judicature 
Society and University Publications of America, Inc. 
1. See, e.g., Mans, Selecting tire Hidden Judiciary;, 63 JUDICATURE 60 (1979). 
2. The hearing process in both systems often emphasizes legal representation and 
the use of evidentiary and procedural rules. Particularly in administrative regulatory ad­
judication, administrative law judges now resemble judges in their duties as finders of 
fact or as decision makers or both. 
3. See Davis, Judicialization ofAdministrative Law: TIre Trial-Type Hearing and lire 
Clranging Status oftire Hearing Officer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389, 391-92. 
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recent period of judicialization, the hearing process more closely re­
sembles the formal, independent model of our general jurisdiction 
courtS.4 
However, this evolution did not resolve the question of the sta­
tus of administrative law judges - are they agency employees or are 
they members of an independent judiciary that is assigned to the 
administrative system of justice? This contlict has come to the fore­
front in the last seven years, during which a series of events have 
precipitated proposed legislation and litigation that consistently call 
into question the role of the administrative law judge.s 
During the Carter Administration, vigorous attempts were 
made to enact legislation that would have provided for a fixed term 
of office and mandatory performance evaluations for administrative 
law judges.6 Several groups of administrative law judges have sued 
their agency, the Social Security Administration, concerning what 
the judges deemed to be illegal evaluations of their performance.7 
Professor Victor Rosenblum states in his article for this symposium: 
Push has been coming to shove recently in sectors of the rela­
tionships between admjnjstrative law judges and employing agen­
cies, with conflicts at the Social Security Administration in the 
visible forefront. The lure and trauma of battle over the power of 
agencies to prescribe and sanction methodologies and outputs for 
administrative law judges have left in limbo implementation of 
earlier consensus-oriented proposals for incremental improve­
ments in the selection and monitoring of the judges and have, in­
stead, placed priorities on legal jousts before the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB) and the federal courts.s 
Most of the attention has been focused on the federal adminis­
trative law judge and the literature dealing with the changing federal 
administrative system is voluminous. Comparatively little attention 
4. These actions were embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. ch. 
324.60 Stat. 231 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 101-106,1305,3105,3344,6362, 
1562 (1982». For an in depth discussion of the role of the federal administrative law 
judge, see V. ROSENBLUM, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS: INTERRELATION OF CASE LAW WITH STATUTORY AND PRAGMATIC FACTORS 
IN DETERMINING AU ROLES,printed in SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE 
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RECENT STUDIES RELEVANT TO 
THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND ApPEALS CRISIS 111 (Comm. Print 1915). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 29-40. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 29-34. 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40. 
8. Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion for Re­
moval ofAdministrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
593, 593-94 (1984) (footnote omitted). 
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has been paid to state administrative agencies. Yet state administra­
tive agencies attempt to regulate the quality of life, and substantially 
more lawyers argue before state agencies than before federal ones. 
Thus, some of the same issues of efficiency and fairness that affect 
the federal system now affect states as well, and they are working to 
resolve these issues in a new way. The approach that eight states 
have implemented is the central panel system in which judges are 
not employed by the agencies providing the cases they hear but by a 
distinct agency created solely to manage the state's administrative 
law judges. Each central panel states' administrative procedure act 
defines the panels' jurisdiction of agency business.9 
Thus, while federal administrative law judges at the federal 
level continue to battle their agencies over the question of whether 
they are an independent judiciary, the states are now providing an 
experimental model for the federal government to explore. JO The 
central panel notion brings into focus three general but critical issues 
surrounding the administrative process. The first issue has to do with 
fairness and the question of which approach is the most equitable 
from the vantages of both the agency and the individual parties to a 
dispute. The second question is which approach to delivering admin­
istrative adjudication provides the most competent but also in­
dependent as well as an unbiased administrative law judge. The 
third issue is which system can provide equity to all parties and do so 
in the most cost-effective way in this era of shrinking resources. 
The purpose of this article is first to describe the operating pro­
cedures of existing central panel systems, including the role of the 
administrative law judge within them. Second, as part of the discus­
sion regarding the administrative law judge role, the article will dis­
cuss the notion of performance evaluation. Third, the work will 
conclude with lessons for the proposed federal central panel of ad­
ministrative law judges derived from past experiences with evalua­
9. See M. RICH & W. BRUCAR. THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRA­
TIVE LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 29 (1983). See also. Levinson. The Cen­
tra/ Panel System: A Framework tho/ Separates AUsfr0m AdministratiYe Agencies. 65 
JUDICATURE 236. 237 nn. 2-3 (1981). The central panel states are: California. Colorado. 
Florida. New Jersey. Massachusetts. Minnesota. Washington and Tennessee. M. RICH & 
W. BRUCAR. supra. at 2. 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55. While the state and federal adminis­
trative systems are different in terms of number of administrative law judges and the 
subject matter of hearings. experimental approaches such as the central panel provide 
working models of different types of organizational structures which serve to translate 
the expertise of administrative law judges and lawyers into tangible results. 
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tion in the federal sector and from the state models provided by 
existing central panel systems. 
II. THE CENTRAL PANEL ApPROACH: A DESCRIPTION 
The central panel system is an approach utilized by eight states 
and the City of New York and is an option available to the states 
under the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure ACt. 11 Con­
ceptually, it can be placed between the federal approach to utiliza­
tion of administrative law judgesl2 and that of an administrative 
court 13 with regard to the degree of separation between administra­
tive law judges and their agencies. Under the central panel arrange­
ment, administrative law judges are employed by an agency created 
solely for their complete management. 14 Where the system is in ef­
fect, use of central panel administrative law judges is either required 
by agencies delineated in the state's APA or is. at the discretion of the 
state agencies. IS These administrative law judges are assigned to pre­
side over hearings when state agencies so request. 16 The central 
panel does not change the power of the administrative law judges; 
administrative law judge decisions are usually recommended deci­
sions subject to the agencies' adoption. 17 
A. Advantages 0/a Central Panel 
Throughout its existence, administrative adjudication has been 
faced with a tradeoff between providing a fair proceeding for the 
litigant and providing justice expediently. One result of the tradeoff 
has been an ongoing tension between agency policymakers and hear­
ing officers who must apply those policies to everyday occurrences. A 
central pool system attempts to alleviate the tension by separating 
the hearing officers from the agency officials and thereby better de­
fine the role of each. IS 
In these days of government budget accounting, administrative 
II. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was adopted in 1946 by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to serve as a guide for 
the states. It was revised in 1961 and most recently in 1981 and has been adopted (with 
some variations) in at least 28 states. 
12. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
13. See generally de Seife, Administrative Low Reform: A Focus on tile Administra­
tive Low Judge, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 229 (1979). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
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agencies are hard pressed to decide how much due process is enough 
consistent with how much they can afford to give litigants. From a 
jurisprudential point of view, the central panel approach seeks to 
provide due process of law through a separation of legislative and 
judicial powers. But it offers a variety of other advantages, as well, 
according to its advocates. 19 
It is proposed that: 
(a) By more efficiently allocating hearing examiners, the system 
is less expensive than assigning administrative law judges per­
manently to one agency. Larger agencies will not have to keep 
all the administrative law judges they need to handle cases dur­
ing peak periods. Small agencies will always have administra­
tive law judges available to them without having to pay the 
larger sums to hire lawyers, for example, to serve as temporary 
administrative law judges.20 
(b) If administrative law judges are not under the control of a 
single administrative agency, proponents say, they may feel 
compelled to render longer, more reasoned justifications for 
their decisions.21 
(c) A central pool allows one administrative staff to handle the 
bookkeeping related to the employment of administrative law 
judges. And locating administrative law judges in one office al­
lows administrative cost cutting innovations to be 
implemented.22 
(d) A central panel would reduce any administrative law judge 
bias in favor of the agency to which they would be otherwise 
assigned, thereby enhancing public confidence in the adminis­
trative system.23 
(e) By providing administrative law judges the opportunity for 
a diversification of experience, the central panel would help 
keep administrative law judges from becoming stale due to re­
19. Id. at 13. 
20. Id. It should be noted that this and most other claimed advantages of the 
central panel system cannot be conclusively documented. Id. at 14. 
21. Id. at 13 (quoting Hearings on Administrative Law Judge System Before Sub­
comm. for Consumers of tlte Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transporlation, 
96th Cong., 2d Scss. 28, 1980) (Testimony of Judge William Fauver). 
22. Id. (quoting Lubbers, A Un!fied Corps ofALJs: A Proposal 10 Tesillte Idea at 
tlte Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 274 (1981». 
23. Adminislralive Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before lite Subcomm. 
on Administralive Praclice and Procedure of tlte Senate Comm. on ,lte Judiciary, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1983) (statement of Loren A. Smith, Chairman. Administrative 
Conference of the United States). 
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peatedly hearing similar cases. Such diversification could also 
serve as a recruitment tool so as to attract the best qualified in­
dividuals to the administrative law judge position.24 
(f) Use of a central panel may provide a more objective envi­
ronment for evaluation of administrative law judge perform­
ance. Administrative agencies ''would have a less immediate 
interest in the evaluation of any particular judge, and there 
would be greater possibility for designing an objective and cred­
ible system for performance evaluation."2s 
B. lJisadvantages of the Central Panel System 
The first of two articulated disadvantages is that the central 
panel office will become a "super-agency"- that is, it will develop 
collective policies and procedures that usurp the powers of the ad­
ministrative agencies. Opponents of the central pool claim the idea is 
another step towards judicialization and is, therefore, another step 
toward reducing the power of agency officials.26 
However, some proponents of the approach see this as a benefit. 
The conflict stems from the tradeoff between due process and admin­
istrative effectiveness that administrators claim they need to make 
and implement policies. ludicialization is, in this view, an unneces­
sary shackling of that discretion. The further administrative law 
judges are from the agencies, the greater the shackling of the admin­
istrators; yet it is the administrative discretion that some proponents 
wish to confine by means of the central panel notion. 
The second purported disadvantage is related to organizational 
structure. Opponents think that placing all decisions relating to ad.;. 
ministrative law judge employment in the hands of just one agency 
or one central panel director risks creating, or the appearance of cre­
ating, a different kind of bias. Central panel director8-i>ften polit­
ical appointees-are responsible for the decisions relating to hiring, 
promoting, evaluating and setting salary for administrative law 
judges. Opponents view this arrangement as potentially creating a 
nonobjective environment for hearings.27 
24. Id. at 110. 
25. Id. 
26. Id.; Lakusta, Operations in an Agency not Subject to tire APA: Public Utilities 
Commission, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 218, 218 (1956). 
27. See Rich, Adapting tire Central Panel System: A Study ofSeven Siaies. 65 JUDI­
CATURE 246. 251-52 (1981). 
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III. THE CENTRAL PANEL ApPROACH: INDEPENDENCE AND 
EVALUATION 
A goal of the central panel is to promote more objective and 
efficient adjudication by separating administrative law judges from 
the agencies they serve. It is one approach intended to balance the 
need for administrative justice with the goal of efficient and effective 
administrative action. But the central panel approach has provided 
only the framework for separating administrative law judges from 
the agencies. The states have individualized the operating proce­
dures to their larger political and economic environments. The result 
has been central panel systems that differ along such dimensions as 
means of funding, the types of agencies served, and the role of the 
central panel directors. This flexibility is an important characteristic 
that the federal government and any state interested in implement­
ing the central panel approach must recognize. 
Because the central panel system separates the administrative 
law judge from the agency, the extent to which the system affects the 
administrative law judge role is an important component when con­
sidering the viability of the pool approach and the lessons the ap­
proach may have for a proposed federal pool system. Proponents of 
an administrative judiciary free of agency influence state that admin­
istrative law judges deserve the judicial independence granted to 
state and federal court judges. Evaluation, as much as any other 
issue, has been seen as a challenge to administrative law judge inde­
pendence. Legislative initiatives to require evaluation have been suc­
cessfully defeated and groups of administrative law judges have filed 
legal actions to stop what they see as illegal performance evalua­
tion.28 Yet proponents cling to the beliefthat evaluation will produce 
a more accountable and therefore more effective administrative sys­
tem and that that evaluation can be accomplished without placing 
administrative law judge decisionmaking independence into 
jeopardy. 
Society utilizes evaluation to make basic decisions in both the 
private and public sectors. People's livelihoods can be enhanced or 
destroyed depending on whether supervisors check "good" or 
"poor" on standardized evaluation forms. Bar associations influence 
the judiciary by releasing results of evaluative bar polls just prior to 
elections. The evaluation of administrative law judges has also be­
28. Su infra text accompanying notes 35-40. 
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come a political factor-an issue that has been subject to congres­
sional inquiry as well as litigation. 
In the late 1970's, there were attempts by the Carter Administra­
tion and members of Congress to apply the precepts of evaluation to 
administrative law judges. Evaluating the performance of these ad­
ministrative judges was to be the fuel to make them more accounta­
ble. But, as the usual case when evaluation is applied, there was 
little that was definitive in terms of goals and criteria. The adminis­
trative law judges were outraged and lobbied heavily against the leg­
islative actions.29 
One bill which provided for evaluation was Senate bill 262.30 
When it was proposed during the late 1970's, it prescribed no sub­
stantive standards for administrative law judge status and tenure and 
would have required evaluation ofjudges by the administrator of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States in accordance with 
the standards and processes prescribed. All administrative law 
judges would be subject to removal or reduction in grade for "unac­
ceptable performance."31 In addition, administrative law judges ap­
pointed after the effective date of the bill would have been appointed 
for terms of ten years subject to reappointment by the administrator 
of the Administrative Conference upon determination of each case 
as to whether the administrative law judge was "affirmatively quali­
fied to be reappointed."32 
The bill would have established performance review boards, at 
least half of whose members would be administrative law judges. 
The administrator was to establish performance appraisal systems 
for administrative law judges, setting standards for: 
the evaluation of whether any administrative law judge [had] per­
formed the duties of his office in a fair, impartial, and effective 
manner. The performance standard [would have], to the maxi­
mum extent feasible, permit[ted] the evaluation of job perform­
ance on the basis of criteria related to duties and responsibilities of 
administrative law judges.33 
29. Despite vigorous efforts by the Carter administration, no bill proposing terms 
of office and evaluation was successful. It is useful to discuss these efforts, however, be­
cause they provide instruction on the problems of implementing evaluation procedures. 
30. S. 262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
31. Id. § 4322(b). 
32. Id. § 4323(b). 
33. Id. § 4322(b). Under § 4322(c), the number and composition of performance 
review boards is not otherwise specified, except that a board conducting an evaluation of 
any particular administrative law judge may not have as a member any individual who is 
an employee of the agency employing the administrative law judge. 
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The performance review board would have been required to conduct 
evaluations during the third and tenth years of administrative law 
judge terms. The evaluation report issued during the tenth year of 
the term, would include a recommendation regarding reappoint­
ment. The findings of any evaluation would have been provided to 
the administrative law judge in a written report "and, if applicable, 
to the chief administrative law judge for the agency in which the 
administrative law judge [was] employed."34 
In addition to legislative efforts to impose evaluation on admin­
istrative law judges at the federal level, litigation has also been uti­
lized by Social Security administrative law judges to dispute the use 
of performance evaluation. In Nash v. Calfano,3S the Court of Ap­
peals for the Second Circuit was asked to deal with the issue of 
whether an administrative law judge had standing to sue when an 
agency allegedly interfered with his or her decisional independence. 
The district court judge had ruled that Simon Nash, an administra­
tive law judge, for the Social Security Administration, had not suf­
fered the injury-in-fact required for standing when he was subjected 
to the bureau's program of monitoring, reviewing, and allegedly con­
trolling administrative law judge decisions. Among other conten­
tions, Judge Nash complained that arbitrary monthly production 
quotas had been established by the agency and that what the agency 
designated as a "quality assurance program" was in reality an at­
tempt to direct a number of decisions awarding or denying social 
security benefits. Administrative law judges deviating from the aver­
age fifty percent reversal rate from all decisions were allegedly coun­
selled and admonished to bring their rate in line with the national 
average on payment sanctions.36 
Judge Kaufman closed the panel's unanimous decision that 
Judge Nash had standing to sue with the following admonition to 
the district court on remand: 
By providing an authoritative delineation of the respective 
rights and powers of the parties to this litigation, and by recogniz­
ing that good administration must not encroach upon adjudicative 
independence, the district court on remand will have the opportu­
nity to advance the principle goal of judicial and cause that judi­
cial administration: reduction of delay without compromise to the 
demands of due process, of which judicial independence is but 
34. Id. § 4322(c). 
35. 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980). 
36. Id. at 13. 
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one, important part.37 
Nash was recently distinguished, however, by the Seventh Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals in the case ofD'Amico v. Schweiker.38 In that 
case, seven Social Security administrative law judges filed a com­
plaint in federal district court seeking to enjoin the Social Security 
Administration from compelling them to apply a new agency policy 
regarding repayment of disability benefits received after cessation of 
a disability. The district court judge dismissed the case on the merits, 
but the Seventh Circuit held on appeal that the administrative law 
judges lacked standing to sue. In so doing, Judge Posner distin­
guished Nash although it appears that, in actuality, he may have 
simply been disagreeing with the Second Circuit. He described the 
Second Circuit's opinion as having challenged "housekeeping as dis­
tinct from substantive directives."39 Unlike Nash, the D'Amico ac­
tion placed the judicial officer "in the position of taking sides in 
controversies that he is supposed to adjudicate impartially."40 
The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) recently added 
fuel to the fire over the status of federal administrative law judges. 
In April, 1983, in Social Security Administration v. Goodman,41 an 
administrative law judge of the MSPB recommended the removal of 
an administrative law judge at the Social Security Administration 
due to unacceptably low productivity. The Board reversed, stating 
that if an agency's case rests upon comparative productivity statis­
tics, "proof of their validity is an essential element of the agency's 
cases."42 
In Social Security Administration v. Brennan ,43 the MSPB found 
that an administrative law judge's independence did not "provide 
immunity from appropriate supervision."44 According to the opin­
ion, administrative law judges were not justified in refusing to com­
ply with reasonable management instructions that did not affect their 
ability to render impartial adjudication.4s 
37. Id. at 17-18. 
38. 698 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1983). 
39. Id. at 907. 
40. Id. 
41. No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Apr. 6, 1983) (recommended decision), rev'd, No. 
HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984) (final decision). 
42. No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 19 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984) (final decision). 
43. No. HQ7521820010 (MSPB June 17, 1983). 
44. Id., slip op. at 7. 
45. /d. 
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IV. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED BY THOSE PROPOSING A FEDERAL 

CENTRAL PANEL 
The federal experience with evaluation of administrative law 
judges has not been a good one. The proposed legislation of the late 
1970's, the Nash and D'Amico litigation, and the Goodman adminis­
trative action are all indicative of a festering discontent among the 
nation's administrative judiciary. 
In contrast, performance evaluation is part of the central panel 
system, albeit some programs are more vigorous and more intluen­
tial than others. One question is whether the differences in accept­
ance and response to evaluation has more to do with the attitudes of 
state hearing officers in contrast to those of federal administrative 
judges or whether it has more to do with the method of evaluation 
used by central panel systems. Professor Victor Rosenblum, a prom­
inent administrative law scholar, has concluded that federal admin­
istrative law judges have been unwilling to accept evaluation at least 
in part because the programs proposed were not specifically designed 
for application to administrative judges.46 Yet this phenomenon is 
not uncommon. Evaluation has become an industry in and of itself 
during the last twenty years. An article probing alternative concep­
tions of evaluation identifies seven such conceptions: evaluation as 
applied science; as system management; as decision theory; as assess­
ment of progress toward goals; as jurisprudence; as descriptive por­
trayal; and as rational empiricism.47 
But despite the vast array of purposes for which evaluation has 
been regarded as magic elixir, the authors recognize a major contlict 
between those who believe that a consensus on values can be fash­
ioned and those who believe that evaluation "has been largely un­
successful in resolving differences among groups who disagree on 
values."48 
This type of contlict can result in organized revolt such as that 
of federal administrative law judges or it can result in the complete 
disregard of evaluation results. Despite the abundance of credible 
literature discussing it, evaluation does not have a uniformly under­
stood meaning. The term "evaluation" carries so many contexts and 
purposes that proposals merely stating that programs or people are 
46. Rosenblum. Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Aspects of Purpose. 
Policy. and Feasibility (Dec. 1983) (unpublished report to the Administrative Confer­
ence) (cited with permission of the author). 
47. Glass &: Ellett, Evaluation Research. 31 ANN. REV. OF PsYCHOLOGY 211 (1980). 
48. [d. at 219. 
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to be evaluated often meet fierce resistance by those who fear that 
generalized evaluations will be used more for abuse than for con­
structive use. 
However, these and other problems notwithstanding, evaluation 
appears to be here to stay. The trend in both the private and public 
sectors is to use evaluation to "reduce uncertainties, improve effec­
tiveness, and make decisions with regard to what those programs, 
personnel, or products are doing and affecting."49 Related to this 
trend is the upcoming consideration by Congress of the proposed 
federal central panel with its overarching question of why an existing 
system which has operated for nearly forty years (that is, since the 
enactment of the AP A) needs a major overhaul. Past experiences 
involving the evaluation of federal administrative law judges and the 
evaluation procedures utilized by on-going central panels provide 
lessons for policymakers. 
A. Lessons From Past Experiences at the Federal Level 
One of the largest problems with performance evaluation is that 
before it will work effectively, the particular mode and methodology 
in which it is delivered must be linked to the particular type ofjob or 
person to be evaluated. "At both conceptual and operational levels, 
evaluation scholars have endowed the term with multifaceted con­
text and contents, so that generalized proposals for evaluation of 
particular programs or personnel carry little that is definitive about 
what is intended or what will endure."50 Senate bill 262's methods 
of evaluation, similarly, did little to match its methodologies to the 
particular profession that it was to evaluate. Neither the bill nor its 
history provided any systematic appraisal of the administrative law 
judges programs, strengths, weaknesses, history, experiences, conse­
quences, and alternatives that would provide a foundation for the 
shift to a term of years. 
The bill did not state why the standards dictated by the federal 
APA needed to be changed and, furthermore, did not elaborate on 
the specific criteria that would be at the core of the evaluation pro­
cess. The overall result was outrage and vigorous general opposition 
by the nation's administrative law judges.51 Applying an evaluation 
49. M. PATrON, PRACTICAL EVALUATION IS (1982). 

so. Rosenblum, supra note 46. 

51. Numerous administrative law judges testified before congressional subcommit­
tees in opposition to the bills. Other administrative law judges filed position papers with 
the legislatures and speeches denouncing the bills were common. 
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system or any other type of major change modifies the duties and 
authority of many people - in this case, both administrative law 
judges and agency personnel. The many facets of administration 
must be considered, including the fact that the administrative pro­
cess today more closely resembles general jurisdiction courts than it 
did at the time of the passage of the federal AP A. The events sur­
rounding Senate bill 262 is a reminder that evaluation must include 
realistic measures that are administered objectively and used only 
for the purposes communicated in advance to those being evaluated. 
B. Lessonsfrom the Central Panel Approach 
Opponents of any type of evaluation of administrative law 
judges cite general jurisdiction judges as examples. According to this 
view, other judges are not evaluated formally because they must en­
joy absolute independence if the judicial system is to remain impar­
tial. For the same reasons, opponents of evaluation state that 
administrative law judges should not be evaluated. 
Proponents of the evaluation of administrative law judges claim 
that administrative law judges should be accountable for their ac­
tions; accountability, in their view, can only be accomplished 
through the evaluation of administrative law judge performance. 
Evaluation of administrative law judges in the central panel states is 
part ofthe duties of the directors of the central panel agency. For the 
most part, these evaluations take the form of annual reviews which, 
in most states, bear upon salary increases granted to administrative 
law judges.52 
Evaluation is very much a part of most central panel adminis­
trative law judges careers. But does evaluation affect their decision­
making independence? By using a questionnaire mail survey, a 
recent study asked central panel administrative law judges whether 
the presence of a performance evaluation system would jeopardize 
their independence. More judges strongly disagree with the idea that 
performance evaluation would jeopardize their independence than 
those who agree. 53 This is somewhat surprising in light of the fairly 
uniform opposition to performance evaluation on the part of the fed­
eral administrative law judges. The same study tabulated the re­
sponses to the question by state. The results vary substantially, 
suggesting that the state central panel judges' viewpoints are not 
52. See, M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 9, for a discussion of various evalua­
tion systems used among the central panel systems. 
53. Id. at 49, 61. 
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fashioned by an organized response to the notion of performance 
evaluation but, rather, by their individual experience. 54 Note then, 
that in the State of New Jersey, where evaluation is among the most 
rigorous of any of the central panel states, nearly three-fifths of the 
responding administrative law judges stated that the presence of a 
mechanism of evaluating their performance would not jeopardize 
their independence. 55 
In all central panel systems, performance evaluation is allowed, 
but by virtue of the structure of the system, the central panel pro­
vides a centralized location from which the evaluation of administra­
tive law judges is conducted. Another imponant point is that 
evaluation is the responsibility of the director of the central panel. 
This means that the sensitive job of evaluating performance is di­
rected by an individual who has day-to-day supervisory contact with 
the administrative law judges. Through utilization of both the evalu­
ator's judgment and the collection of standardized forms, the system 
provides the opponunity for an informed decision that will be ac­
cepted by the administrative law judges as being factual and 
objective. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The notion of performance evaluation has not been accepted by 
the federal administrative law judge community while it is very 
much a pan of the existing central panel approach. In asking why 
such a difference exists, legislators should look to the state models 
for possible answers. It should be noted also that the federal govern­
ment provides a totally different environment for a central panel sys­
tem than any state administrative process. As Jeff Lubbers of the 
Administrative Conference stated: 
[a] platoon of 41 New Jersey judges may work well, but 1100 fed­
eral [administrative law judges] may make for an unmanageable 
corps. Furthermore, five federal agencies now employ nearly 1000 
[administrative law judges] and the other 24 employing agencies 
average fewer than 7 judges each. Proponents of any reform must 
bear the burden of attending to the practical details of its pro­
posed application to such a bulk of our judiciary.56 
Yet, despite the differences between the state and federal sys­
54. Id. at 49. 
55. Id. at 48-49. 
56. Lubbers, A Un!fied Corps ofAUs: A Proposal to Test tire Idea at tire Federal 
LeYel, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 275 (1981). 
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tems, Senate bill 1275,51 if enacted, will establish the framework for 
a central panel of federal administrative law judges. That bill would 
create a new administrative agency known as the Administrative 
Law Judge Corps of the United States. As an agency, the Corps 
would be subject to the various government regulations and admin­
istrative housekeeping with which agencies must currently comply. 58 
Its Council would consist of members appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate. 59 The Council would be authorized to 
prescribe the rules of practice and procedure for the conduct of pro­
ceedings before the corps except that procedural rules governing an 
existing class of proceedings could not be changed for two years 
without the agency's approval.60 
As this bill is considered by various congressional committees 
on its path toward enactment, it is imperative that state central 
panels be considered as "laboratory experiments" from which the 
federal administrative system can learn. The central panels provide 
lessons on issues surrounding implementation of pool systems, in­
cluding the types of opposition that will no doubt emanate from 
agencies fearing that their power will be diluted. The state central 
panels are also pilot programs providing working models of utilizing 
an administrative law judge for hearing a variety of cases, including 
both regulatory and benefits adjudication. 
Another lesson has to do with evaluation - a topic that in to­
day's world may well come to the forefront of considerations revolv­
ing around proposed central panel legislation. One key to any 
evaluation system is acceptance by those being evaluated that the 
system is objective and is used for the specific purpose for which the 
evaluation is intended. The central panel, according to its propo­
nents, provides the opportunity for a much clearer link between the 
evaluation and its consequences. 
Lessons from events surrounding Senate bill 262 and the ongo­
ing central panel programs suggest that, first, the need to change the 
current system must be carefully analyzed and documented. This 
should include an examination of budgetary matters. Proponents of 
the central panel approach believe that their system can deliver un­
biased administrative justice at less cost. Budgetary considerations 
were primary issues among the legislatures that enacted central 
57. S.1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see 129 CONGo REc. S6609-13 (dailyed. 
May 12, 1983). 
58. S. 1275, 98th Cong., ist Sess. § 2 (1983) (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 562(a». 
59. Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 564(c». 
60. Id. (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. § 565(7». 
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panels, and cost is just as important at the federalleve1.61 Cost justi­
fications used by the states should be examined; aside from gut level 
reactions and bottom line "before and after" analyses, however, 
strikingly little data exists. Financial studies need to be conducted 
that confirm or refute claims that central panel systems can be oper­
ated more efficiently while providing equitable proceedings. 
Second, lessons indicate that any ongoing evaluation to be part 
of the proposed federal central panel should be designed at the out­
set to make it as useful and as accepted by the administrative law 
judges and agency personnel as possible. Evaluation can and should 
be used for educational purposes - as a tool to determine where 
changes need to be made. For example, a new program for behav­
iorally disordered adolescents, being implemented in the Chicago 
area, is utilizing a rigorous, operationally defined evaluation system 
not just to determine whether the program is effective. In addition, 
the results of the periodic evaluation will become part of the pro­
gram's therapeutic component.62 The therapist and family will dis­
cuss the evaluation results to determine whether approaches to the 
problems taken by the therapist and family need to be modified. 
They will use the results to consider whether the goals of the therapy 
were realistic and whether the family would benefit by continuing 
the program in either its current or modified state. 
Similarly, a carefully designed evaluation in the administrative 
adjudication context can be used to identify problems with the sys­
tem that all administrative law judges may be experiencing. And, in 
the central panels, the evaluation provides the "excuse" necessary 
for the administrative law judge to discuss general problems and in­
dividual cases with the central panel director (if the evaluation in­
cludes a personal interview component). 
Another goal of evaluation is to increase the likelihood that the 
best people are in the positions best suited to them and that they are 
suitably compensated. But when evaluation is used for reward and 
punishment of administrative judges, there should be a variety of 
61. For a discussion on budgetary issues surrounding the central panel approach, 
see M. RICH & w. BRucAR, supra note 9, at 23-25. 
62. Illinois State Board of Education grant no. U4-20160 awarded to the A.E.R.O. 
Special Education School District and the Foundation for Educational Research, Inc. 
The evaluation system includes quantification of past educational records for use as con­
trol variables and an on-going data collection effort during the delivery of in-home thera­
peutic services. The evaluation program was specifically designed to accompany the 
therapeutic component of this particular program. 
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measures in addition to the viewpoint of one supervisor, such as the 
opinions of litigants and attorneys. 
In considering a federal central panel, it would be wise for 
Congress to look at the role of the state central panel directors in­
cluding the potential bias emanating from a process which allows 
political figures to have complete control over choosing the director. 
But in looking at the role of the director, the Congress should con­
sider how using such a familiar figure as the director to conduct per­
formance evaluation may make the system more palatable to 
administrative law judges. 
Senate bill 262 and the central panel system each provide les­
sons to be learned by policymakers considering a federal central 
panel system of administrative law judges. If such a system is to be 
successfully implemented and maintained, we should not ignore 
those lessons. 
